College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1976

The "Elaborate Interweaving of Jurisdiction": Labor
and Tax Administration and Enforcement of
ERISA and Beyond
John W. Lee
William & Mary Law School, jwleex@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Lee, John W., "The "Elaborate Interweaving of Jurisdiction": Labor and Tax Administration and Enforcement of ERISA and Beyond"
(1976). Faculty Publications. 617.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/617

Copyright c 1976 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

LAW REVIEW
Volume 10

Spring 1976

Number 3

THE "ELABORATE INTERWEAVING OF JURISDICTION:"
LABOR AND TAX ADMINISTRATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF ERISA AND BEYOND

John W. Lee*
On Labor Day ~974, President Ford signed into law. the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,t commonly·known by its
acronym ERISA. The genesis of ERISA is found in a· sf6-ay released
in 1965 by the President's Committee on Corporate .P~nsion Fund
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs,titled
"Public
'
Policy and Private Pension Programs-A Report to the President on
Private Employee Retirement Plans." The Committee had been
established in 1962 by President Kennedy in recognition of the
growth of the pension industry and the need for reform. The report
made recommendations as to vesting; funding; termination insurance and portability; perceived inequities under tax laws as to coverage, integration with social security, absence of limitations on
contributions, and favorable treatment as to lump-sum distributions of employer securities; fiduciary reforms, principally concern-·
ing investments in employer securities; and disclosure to plan participants as to investment holdings. This report served as the basis
for many of the subsequent legislative proposals in the pension area,
principally beginning in 1968 in the labor committees of the House
and Senate. By September, 1973, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare and the Senate Committee on Finance had
* A.B., University of North Carolina, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968; LL.M.
(Taxation), Georgetown University, 1970. Partner, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox &
Allen, Richmond, Virginia.
t Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 897 [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
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reported out of committee major pension reform bills-S. 4 and S.
1179, respectively. These two labor and tax bills were melded into
a single compromise bill and tacked as a rider onto a House revenue
bill, H.R. 4200, in September of 1973 when the compromise labortax bill was passed by the Senate. This bill contained, among
others, provisions as to coverage, vesting, minimum funding, optional forms of benefits, requirements for tax-qualification of plans,
limitations on contributions and benefits, portability and termination insurance, reporting and disclosure, and fiduciary standards
and enforcement. As discussed below, H.R. 4200 assigned specific
functions to the Department of Labor and to the Department of the
Treasury, thereby tending to create a dominant role for each of these
agencies of the executive branch and minimizing the degree of
jurisdictional overlap in the above areas.
After the Senate passed H.R. 4200, the House Committee on Education and Labor reported out of committee a pension reform bill,
H.R. 2 on October 2, 1973, and the House Committee on Ways and
Means similarly reported out H.R. 12481 on February 5, 1974. Subsequent refinements of the bills of these two committees, H.R. 12906
and H.R. 12855, were introduced to the House and then a compromise, H.R. 2, was passed by the House on February 28, 1974.
Unlike the Senate bill, the House bill made a deliberate effort to
solidify and to make comparable the labor and tax interests in retirement plans by adopting comparable labor and tax titles to the
bill, particularly as to participation, vesting, funding and prohibited transactions.
The conflicting House and Senate bills were sent to a Conference
Committee, with conferees appointed from the labor and tax committees of the House and Senate. The issues of jurisdiction and
responsibility for enforcement were the most difficult problems confronting the conferees in reaching a compromise between these two
bills. The Conference Committee sought to combine the historical
expertise of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as to qualified pension plans with the traditional concern of the Labor Department
(Labor) for the interest of the working man. The Committee decided
to overlap the jurisdiction of the two agencies, as in the House bill,
and to define clearly the dominant role of each agency, as in the
Senate bill. The following discussion will focus on this "elaborate
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interweaving of jurisdiction," a jurisdiction that has been further
complicated by a recent decision that may lead to involving the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the pension area.
I.

PRIORLAW

Under prior law, the IRS was responsible for the qualification of
a retirement plan as tax exempt under Code Section 401, disqualification of a plan upon audit for violation of the prior narrow prohibited transaction rules or for failure to comply with the exclusive
benefit rule. While the sanction of disqualification was not effective, 1 the larger shortcoming of the Service's administration lay in
its failure to find a partial termination of a plan when there was a
substantial shrinkage of work force. Indeed, in this context, Representative Dent, Chairman of the General Subcommittee on Labor
of the House Committee on Education and Labor, asserted that if
the Service had enforced its own rules there would have been no
need for pension reform legislation. 2 On the other hand, Labor was
responsible for the administration of the Welfare Pension Plans
Disclosure Act (WPPDA). Rather than enforcing the Act, Labor
administered the WPPDA principally as an information gathering
tool. 3 Participants in pension plans did not use the Act to protect
their benefits.
On a technical level, there were basically two questions. What
should be the appropriate sanctions for violations of the prohibited
transaction and exclusive benefit requirements of the new provisions such as the minimum funding requirement? Which agency
should be the administrator of such sanctions? 4 The latter question
I. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 383].
2. Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House

Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
2 Hearing.~).
3. See, e.g., HearingsonS. 4, S. 1179andS.I631 beforetheSubcomm. on Private Pension
Plans of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 636, 771, 988, 1096-97
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Hearings]; CoMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF REPORTING AND BONDING PROVISIONS OF THE WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCWSURE ACT OF 1959,
IN THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVICE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (March
1967); 119 CoNG. REc. 30004 (1973). See generally Sickles, Introduction: The Significance and
Complexity of ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 205, 207 (1975).
4. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 1064-66.
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was clouded by conflicting views concerning the prior performance
by Labor and by the IRS in their respective "spheres of influence."
Probably the fact that certain Congressmen in the labor committees had been advocating pension reform for six years or so prior
to the tax committees of the Congress becoming interested in such
reform made resolution of the problem of jurisdiction by the Labor
Department or Treasury, or both, even more difficult. This is,
perhaps, best epitomized by the following statement by Representative Dent:
I am not about, as I said, to surrender 6 years of work to Johnniecome-latelies who have not had the experience nor have they . . . in
my opinion been exposed as this subcommittee has been exposed, to
so many heartbreaking conditions that have come up because there
is no protection of a pension system. 5

The consensus was that disqualification of a plan or immediate
vesting of funded plan benefits upon termination were ineffective
sanctions. Disagreement, however, arose as to whether an excise tax
and in general the "self-enforcing" aspects of taxation were more
effective than a court order, either as an injunction or money judgment, to enforce a violation. Those who favored legally mandated
rules usually believed that pension protection belonged in Labor
because· its function was to protect the interests of workers. 6 This
analysis confused the sanction with the enforcer. Professor Halperin
pointed out in the Hearings that the question should be first
the sanction, rather than the administering agency. 7 While most
witnesses appeared to believe that as an ultimate remedy a court
order or a money judgment would be more effective, 8 several proTreasury witnesses argued that the self-enforcing approach (or the
excise tax approach) would actually be more effective than court orders. 9 It was n9ted, for example, that retirement plans had adopted
almost immediately the changes in the "integration" formula in
order to ma,intain tax qualification, whereas the similar problems of
age and sex "discrimination required a multiplicity of slow court
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

H.R. 2 Hearing.~. supra note 2, at 761. See also id. at 331, 508, 760-61.
Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 249.
!d. at 631.
ld. at 1096.
!d. at 635, 808.
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suits. Consequently; it was argued that where legislation carries
enforcement only through court orders without automatic sanctions,
all too frequently the employer or taxpayer only complies when
ordered by a court. 10 The strength of this argument was weakened,
however, by the tendency of its advocates to ask also that Labor
enforcement of such things as fiduciary responsibility through court
actions be entirely deleted in favor of, say, an excise tax approach. 11
This position, in turn, overlooked the inherent weaknesses in certain
aspects of the self-enforcing theory of tax sanctions. Most advocates
of the self-enforcement aspects of the Code merely stated that the
denial of tax qualification was a highly effective stick, particularly
in view of the almost universal practice of obtaining an advance
termination letter. 12 This approach did not address, however, the
situation in which the employer could not afford to pay the tax in
any event. 13 In addition, especially in the fiduciary area, it would
not result in the fiduciary making good any trust fund losses he
caused unless other steps were taken. 14
In summary, while the self-enforcement system undoubtedly
worked quite well in initial qualification of a plan, neither it nor an
excise tax approach would be effective in an area such as mandatory
funding if the employer felt that he could not afford it. Of course,
picking up a second tier excise tax equal to the amount required to
be funded could be quite effective. 15 Particularly in the area of fiduciary standards, an excise tax, on its surface, had the weakness of
not making good trust fund losses. If, however, the excise tax were
applicable only upon the failure to make good such losses, such a
tax would be fairly effective since the employer would have the
choice of either making restitution to the trust fund prior to paying
the excise tax or paying "the same amount to Treasury.
Many witnesses, who identified more with organized labor, took
the position that the Service was concerned only with whether a
retirement plan was a bona fide plan and not just a scheme for the
10. ld. at 808.
11. ld. at 622, 818.
12. ld. at 373, 488.
13. ld. at 623.
14. ld. at 764.
15. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 807).
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avoidance of taxes. 16 A more sophisticated argument held that
officials in the Service viewed their job as a mandate to maximize
Government revenues and, in giving priority to that objective, they
construed narrowly exemptions, exclusions and deductions. On the
other hand, the argument continued, a regulatory official believes
that he should construe legislation wherever possible for the benefit
of the plaintiff who seeks his aid. 17 The Congressmen identfied with
the labor bills usually favored this analysis. 18 In fact, Representative
Dent flatly stated that the Treasury Department was primarily interested in maintaining its revenue base and the question of soundness of the retirement funds was secondary to its main job of raising
money. 19 Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, took sharp issue. He asserted that the revenue law was not used
entirely and exclusively to produce revenue but had long been a tool
to achieve many social purposes. 2° Furthermore, the then current
tax subsidy for qualified plans, the tax deductions on 14 billion
dollars a year in contributions (which were increasing annually) as
well as the absence of taxes on the plans' income, 21 led Congressmen
on the tax committees to believe that they had a responsibility to
follow through in tax administration and enforcement to see that
the plans were being used to achieve the policy objectives of the law.
As Senator Curtis pointed out: "I can't see how they [revenue
agents] c;an do their job in determining if the tax dollar has been
overly deducted until they determine that it has gone into a qualified program and has been paid out according to the law that Congress has written." 22 Furthermore, tax practitioners asserted that in
their experience, particularly in recent years, the Service had indeed
been concerned with the rights of individual participants in grant16. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 246, 631. It was also asserted (but surely
without foundation) that a conflict of interest would arise if the primary enforcement mechanism were imposition of excise taxes for violation of statutory minimum standards, at least
in a deduction-generating area such as funding, since it would be in the Treasury's interest
not to enforce funding contribution requirements which would create additional current tax
deductions. ld. at 384.
17. ld. at 751.
18. ld. at 1091 (remarks of Senator Javits).
19. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 175, 393.
20. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 627.
21. Id. at 629.
22. ld. at 627-31.
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ing its ruling letters23-this was perhaps most clearly seen in the
areas of vesting in small plans and in the area of salaried-only plans.
It seemed rather generally accepted that the Service had substantial experience and expertise particularly as to coverage, i.e., qualification of plans and vesting, perhaps less so as to funding. 24 Some
of those in the labor camp suggested that those individuals with
expertise be moved from Treasury to the Department of Labor. 25
This suggestion overlooked, as discussed below, the continuing
functions of review that would have to remain in the IRS. One of
the usually unarticulated themes was that Labor was partial
toward labor as contrasted with management. 26 Senator Javits,
ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, indirectly corroborated this thought, stating that
"it is not the greater effectiveness of the IRS but rather anxiety over
administration by the Labor Department of new pension laws which
creates the impetus for putting IRS in charge of pension reform
legislation." 27 Senator Long suggested in this context that Treasury would be neutral, identifying with neither labor nor management.28 But it was frequently suggested that the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue did not really want to have the authority to go
into district court and enjoin employers to make deductions, and
some even suggested that this could not be done. 29
Most tax practitioners maintained that the existing Code requirements for tax qualification of plans and their continued operation
in compliance with the tax system ought to be investigated and
monitored by the IRS. 30 Both Senators Williams and Javits agreed
that the enforcement of eligibility and vesting standards as to plan
qualification would have to remain in the Service. 31 Given this
premise of retained jurisdiction by the Service, Senator Bentsen was
particularly concerned that Labor jurisdiction over registration and
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

ld. at 636, 651; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 51.
Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 621, 634.
ld. at 776-77.
ld. at 627.
ld. at 1104.
ld. at 627.
ld. at 848.
ld. at 649.
ld. at 1094-95.
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auditing of plans as to minimum funding, vesting, etc., would result
in duplication of expense on the part of employers (as well as the
government).=12 This theme was repeated frequently by witnesses. 33
They contended that additional expenses would be generated by
dual staff, coverage and investigations and by conflicting requirements. The primary answer of Senators Javits and Williams to the
contentions was that while there would be duality, a duplication of
functions would not arise since the purposes of the labor provisions
and the tax provisions were not the same. 34 However, this analysis
failed to resolve the problem of conflicting requirements, particularly as to questions such as minimum vesting, nor did it really
answer the problem of duality of registration, initial qualification
and continuing compliance with duplicate expenses at each stage.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of Labor enforcement of
the fiduciary standards was that the underlying theory of the annual
reports was that if the participants knew of their rights they could
then enforce, or call upon Labor to enforce them. In short, since the
annual reports were necessary for the enforcement, they and enforcement should not be separated. 35 A solution suggested was initial qualification by Labor and then certification by it to the IRS
that the plan was qualified. 36 As to audit, it was suggested that
Labor would perform audits and notify the Treasury when excise
taxes were due. 37 Of course, this type of primary responsibility in one
agency approach was ultimately adopted, but in mirror image-in
effect the IRS qualifies and audits and then notifies Labor, which
then can seek judicial enforcement, prior to and in lieu of Service
imposition of tax penalties.
32. ld. at 370, 1099.
33. ld. at 513, 622, 635, 649, 682; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 179.
34. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 1062-68.
35. !d. at 383, 1062. The argument was also raised that between the Department of Labor
and the Internal Revenue Service, only Labor was equipped to enforce, and interested in the
enforcement of, private rights. ld. at 848. While the Service itself had taken the position in
published rulings that its function is not to enforce an employee's rights under a qualified
plan (but failure to follow plan provisions, for example as to distributions, could result in
disqualification as not for the exclusive benefit of employees), Rev. Rul. 70-315, 1970-1 CuM.
BUJ.L. 91, in practice employee complaints about failure to follow plan provisions frequently
trigger an audit of the plan.
36. Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 747, 778.
37. ld.
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II. ERISA: ADMINISTRATION
A.

JURISDICTION: OVERVIEW

By carefully assigning specific functions to Labor and to the ffiS,
the Senate bill tended to create a dominant role for each agency in
a particular area and minimize the degree of overlap. 38 The House
bill, on the other hand, created extensive overlapping by assigning
duplicate functions, particularly in the areas of participation, vesting and funding to both the IRS and Labor. 39 Unlike the Senate bill,
however, the House bill deliberately attempted to solidify and make
comparable labor and tax interests in retirement plans by adopting
comparable labor and tax titles to the bill. Although Representatives Dent and Ullman maintained that there was no conflict
between Labor and the ffiS, because the two agencies were involved
in this area for different purposes but with the same criteria, many
in the House felt that conflict would arise. 40
ERISA adopted the framework of the House bill in overlapping
jurisdiction and the Senate approach of clearly defining the dominant roles of each agency. 41 Based on the premise that most retirement plans would seek tax qualification or terminate, ERISA grants
the initial stage responsibility as to participation, vesting and
funding standards to the ffiS. On the other hand, the Secretary of
Labor has authority to grant certain variances and promulgate certain regulations that are impressed with collective bargaining or
labor interest. 42

B.

INITIAL STAGE JURISDICTION

The administration of qualified retirement plans is separated into
two stages: (1) the initial stage when a plan seeks initial determination by the ms that the plan qualifies for special tax benefits, and
(2) the operational stage of continued eligibility of a plan for obtain38. 120 CoNG. REc. S 15750-51 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
39. ld.
40. Compare 120 CoNG. REc. H 1129-30 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1974) (remarks of Representatives Dent and Ullman) with id. at H 1167 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1974) (remarks of Representative Archer).
41. ld. at S 15750-51 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
42. ld. at S 15741, 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
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ing such benefits. 4 1 In exercising its initial stage jurisdiction, the IRS
can require any person applying for approval of his plan, in addition
to the materials and information generally necessary for administration of the tax laws, to provide such other reasonably available
information and complete such forms as the Secretary of Labor
may require. Currently only a single set of forms for qualification is
required. The Service also requires that each applicant provide evidence that "interested parties" have been notified of the request for
determination. 44 Additionally, the Secretary of the Treasury notifies
the Secretary of Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation when the Service receives an application for a determination
as to the tax status of a plan. 45
=

Once the IRS makes a determination as to the qualified status of
a plan or trust, the Secretary of the Treasury then notifies the Secretary of Labor of his determination and furnishes him copies of the
forms and information submitted. 46 Such determination includes an
opinion whether the plan is qualified under the Internal Revenue
Code. 47 If a determination request is withdrawn, 48 the Treasury must
notify Labor. Once the Service determines that a plan is qualified,
the plan will be treated as meeting the initial requirements of Labor
as to participation and vesting. 49 Thus, the Service plays the dominant role in the initial stage of qualifying a plan. 50
The Secretary of the Treasury also must afford the Secretary of
Labor, when he so requests, an opportunity to comment on the initial determination in any case involving participation or vesting
standards under procedures giving him an ample opportunity to
comment, but not causing undue delay in the granting of initial
determinations. 51 The Secretary of Labor may so comment only if
43. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 356-65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 12801.
44. ERISA § 3001(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (1975).
45. H.R. REP No. 1280, supra note 43, at 357.
46. ERISA § 3001(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1201(d) (1975).
47. /d.
48. /d.; H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 357.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 358. ERISA§ 3001(d) provides: "The Secretary
of Labor shall accept the determination of the Secretary of Treasury as prima facie evidence
of initial compliance . . . " 29 U.S.C.A. § 1201(d) (1975).
50. 120 CoNG. REc. S 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
51. ERISA § 3001(b)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1201(b)(1) (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note
43, at 357.
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he is requested to do so in writing by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation or 10 employees (or 10% of the employees, if lesser),
who would be viewed as "interested parties" under the Tax Court
declaratory judgment definition. 52 The Secretary of Labor transmits a copy of the requests to the Department of the Treasury
within five business days after their receipt. 53 If the Secretary of
Labor does not submit comments on behalf of such groups of employees within 30 days after receiving a petition from the employees,
the Secretary of the Treasury must afford the interested parties a
reasonable opportunity to comment upon the initial request for
determination. Within this 30-day period, the Secretary of Labor
must notify the Secretary of the Treasury, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation and the employees in question, as to whether
he will comment on the application and as to any matters raised in
the requests upon which he is not going to comment. 54 Congress
viewed the Secretary of Labor as taking the dominant role in protecting the interests of participants in this initial stage jurisdiction
(as well as in the subsequent operational stage). 55
The above procedures for enabling employees to comment upon
an application for determination are not the exclusive means by
which employees may participate in the qualification proceedings,
viz., they have available the declaratory judgment provisions of
ERISA. 56 An important question here and in the declaratory
judgment provisions is whether an employee who does not qualify
under the plan has standing to intervene in the initial qualification
process or to initate a declaratory judgment proceeding. The temporary requlations defining the term "interested parties" answer this
question affirmatively-in the initial qualification for a post-ERISA
plan and in the first determination request as to continuing qualification after the ERISA-amendments for a pre-September 2, 1974
plan, all present employees qualify as "interested parties."57
The above outlined procedures apply not only to the initial quali52. ERISA § 3001(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1201(b)(2) (1975).
53. ld.
54. ld. § 3001(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.A. § 120l(b)(4) (1975).
55. 120 CoNG. REc. S 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
56. See INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 7476. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43,
at 357·58.
57. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 11.7476·l(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 24002 (1975).
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fication of a plan seeking the special tax benefits under the Code,
but also to a request for an IRS determination as to any amendment
to the terms of a plan or a trust which seeks a favorable determination from the Service. 58
C.

OPERATIONAL STAGE JURISDICTION

Participation and Vesting

1.

The IRS in carrying out its auditing function has the duty of
examining a plan to determine whether it satisfies the minimum
participation and vesting standards of the Code. 5 9 Before commencing any proceedings to determine whether the plan or trust complies
with the minimum standards, however, the Service must notify
Labor. 611 While this notice need not be made prior to the time the
Service begins its audit or review of a plan to verify that the minimum vesting and participation standards have been satisfied, Congress expected that if in the course of the review or audit doubts or
questions were raised by the IRS as to whether the plan met the
minimum standards, the Secretary of the Treasury would then notify the Secretary of Labor. 61 The notification must be made before
the IRS issues its 30-day letter of intent to disqualify the plan or
trust. 62 Except in cases in which the collection of taxes imposed
under the Code is in jeopardy, 63 the Secretary of the Treasury will
not issue a determination of disqualification on the basis of failure
to meet the minimum standards until the expiration of a 60-day
period after the date of notice to the Secretary of Labor. 64
This 60-day period is designed to allow the Secretary of Labor to
determine whether he should begin to take action in a federal dis1)8.
1)9.
60.
61.

H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 358.
/d.
/d.
ERISA § 3002(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1202(a) (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at

~1)8.

62. /d.
6~. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 6861 permits an immediate assessment of an income tax
deficiency where the Commissioner believes assessment or collection may be jeopardized by
delay. The major definition of "jeopardy" is found at section 6851(a)(1): "(A] taxpayer
designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his property therefrom, or to
conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act tending to prejudice or to render
wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax . . . . "
64. ERISA § ~002(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1202(a) (1975).
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trict court to compel compliance by the plan with the Title I participation and vesting provisions of ERISA, or to coordinate any action
he may be required to take by reason of a complaint from a participant or a beneficiary. 65 This procedure sets the stage for the "dominant role" which Congress expected the Secretary of Labor to play
in protecting the interests of participants in the compliance stage
of jurisdiction.5 6 This 60-day period may be extended by the Treasury if it determines that an extension would enable the Secretary
of Labor to obtain compliance with the requirements of the law
during the extended period. 67 To this end, the Secretary of the
Treasury is to provide the Secretary of Labor with copies of any
notices that he issues to the plan administrator as to minimum
participation and vesting standards under Title II of ERISA. 68 The
Secretary of Labor generally will not apply the participation and
vesting provisions of Title I of ERISA to any plan or trust subject
to Code sections 410(a) and 411 (the minimum participation and
minimum vesting standards), but will refer alleged general violations of these standards to the Secretary of the Treasury, except as
to matters relating to individual benefits. 69
2.

Minimum Funding

Essentially the same two-step jurisdiction also applies to the excise taxes imposed upon failure of an employer to meet the minimum funding standards. Thus, the Secretary of the Treasury must
notify the Secretary of Labor before imposing any excise tax on an
employer for failure to meet the minimum funding standards. And
in other than jeopardy situations, the Secretary of the Treasury will
give the Secretary of Labor an opportunity to comment on the appropriateness of imposing such tax before doing so. 70 After consultation with him, the Secretary of the Treasury may in appropriate
cases waive or abate the 100% excise tax on the amount of underfunding.71 Congress expected the agencies would coordinate their
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 358.
See 120 CoNG. REc. S. 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
ERISA§ 3001(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (1975).
H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 358.
ERISA § 3002(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1202(a) (1975).
ld. § 3002(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1202(b) (1975).
ld.; see H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 359.
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respective responsibilities under the funding standard with each
other and as part of this coordination, 72 at the request of the Secretary of Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the IRS
is to investigate immediately whether any liability for the tax on
failure to meet the minimum funding standards is due. 73 Conversely, if the Secretary of Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation seeks compliance in any case involving the construction
or application of the minimum participation, vesting or funding
standards, they will grant a reasonable opportunity to the Secretary
of the Treasury to review and comment upon any proposed pleadings or briefs before filing them. 74
3.

Prohibited Transactions

Jurisdictional provisions virtually identical to the mm1mum
funding jurisdictional rules apply to prohibited transactions. 75 Congress anticipated that both Secretaries would consult, whenever
necessary, about the prohibited transactions provisions in order to
coordinate the rules applicable under these standards. 76 Congress
noted that, in order to best coordinate these rules, the two Secretaries might want to set up a joint board to review and coordinate
them. 77 The two departments have jointly issued class exemptions
from the prohibited transactions provisions for certain classes of
broker-dealer transactions. 78 Moreover, pursuant to Revenue Procedure 75-26, 79 if an applicant seeks an exemption from a prohibited transaction provision under ERISA section 408(a) and Code
section 4975, he can file copies of the same application with the
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. As yet, however, no joint
board, as such, has been established.
72. !d.
73. ERISA § 3002(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1202(b) (1975).
74. !d. § 3002(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1202(d) (1975). The Secretary of Labor need not obtain
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury and the latter may intervene and file his own
pleadings or briefs in any case. H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 359.
75. ERISA § 3003, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (1975).
76. H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 359.
77. !d.
78. Prohibited Transaction Exemption 75-1, 40 Fed. Reg. 50845 (1975).
79. 1975-1 CuM. BuLL. 722.
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As part of the anticipated coordination, the IRS, at the request
of the Secretary of Labor or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, is to initiate an immediate investigation as to any person's
liability for the tax on prohibited transactions. 8° Congress pointed
out that such an "elaborate interweaving of jurisdiction" would
require the utmost cooperation and coordination between the two
agencies in order to avoid exposing plans to unjustified administrative burdens. 81 This is particularly true in areas such as prohibited
transactions, where both agencies have similar responsibilities but
different interests:
In order to avoid 'shopping' for opinions by plans as well as to
minimize uncoordinated applications of the prohibited transaction
rules, both agencies should give careful consideration to the recommendations of the conferees for establishing administratively a joint
board which could provide 'one-stop' service in this connection. 82

4.

Regulations and Rulings

ERISA assigned to the Treasury the authority to promulgate the
regulations under the general provisions relating to participation,
vesting and funding, except where it gave specific authority to the
Secretary of Labor to prescribe appropriate regulations, such as the
regulations defining what constitutes a "year of service." 83 Congress
intended that both Treasury and Labor regulations in this area
would each be binding upon the other department, unless otherwise
provided in ERISA. Congress also expected that the two depart80. ERISA § 3003(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1203(a) (1975). Conversely under ERISA § 3003(c)
whenever the Secretary of Labor obtains information indicating that a party-in-interest or
~isqualified person is violating the prohibited transaction provisions of Title I (Labor's jurisdiction there extends only to the fiduciaries violating such provisions), he is to transmit such
information to the Secretary of the Treasury. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1203(c) (1975).
81. 120 Corm. REc. S. 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams). Some
commentators felt that there WB:S a distinct possibility that, absent a joint Labor-Treasury
advisory opinion office, one agency might take an opposite view in the area of prohibited
transactions from the other. There was little expectation that joint rulings would be issued
on the short notice necessary to seize an investment opportunity without delay. Cummings,
Casey & Cummings, Overlap of IRS and Labor in Regulating Compensation Plan Can Create
Problems, 42 ,J. TAX. 7, 8 (1974). Final review of individual exemption requests has been
glacially slow indeed, to the date of the writing of this article.
82. 120 CoNG. REc. S. 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
83. ERISA §§ 202(a)(3)(A), 203(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1052(a)(3)(A), 1053(b)(2)(A)
(1975).
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ments would consult and coordinate closely with each other in prescribing the regulations that each would issue under the various
ERISA provisions. 84 This had been the case to date. The writer has
been informed orally that currently, both labor and tax ERISA regulations are reviewed in joint sessions by representatives from Labor,
the Treasury and IRS.
At this date the major area of overlapping application of ERISA
regu)ations by Labor and the IRS has arisen in the latter's approval
of post-ERISA amendments to plans and new plans under ERISA.
For instance, ERISA assigned to Labor the primary jurisdiction in
promulgation of regulations concerning hours and years of service.
Hence, the definition of "hour of service" or "year of service" in a
post-ERISA retirement plan will be governed by Labor regulations,
while the qualification of that provision under ERISA will be judged
initially by the IRS. Accordingly, prior to promulgation of proposed
and temporary regulations on hours of service and years of service
by Labor, the IRS stated 85 that pending promulgation of Labor regulations defining the term "hour of service" a plan had to provide
that an employee would be credited with hours of service under
certain specified conditions. The writer understands that the Department of Labor drafted these conditions for the IRS.
Under ERISA section 3004(a) the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Secretary of Labor in carrying out provisions relating to the
same subject matter are charged with consulting with each other in
the development of rules, regulations, practices and forms to the
extent possible for the efficient administration of the provisions of
ERISA in order to reduce to the maximum extent practical duplication of effort, conflicting requirements and the burden of compliance (including annual reports filed by plan administrators). These
statutory "directives" and "grants" for coordination in regulations,
rulings and forms to date have been ably and fully heeded by the
IRS and Labor. Nowhere is this clearer than in the annual information return report form, where the old tax forms 4848, 4848 Schedule
A, 4849 and 990-P and labor form D-1 have been combined in a
single form 5500. 86
84. H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 360.
85. Question and Answer P-9, January 8, 1975.
86. See 40 Fed. Reg. 45134-56 (1975).
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Under ERISA section 3004(b), the two Secretaries may make arrangements for .cooperation and mutual assistance in the performance of their functions under ERISA to the extent that they find
practicable and consistent with the law. Congress expected the
maximum coordination in those areas where one agency has the sole
authority to prescribe regulations as well as where both agencies
share this authority. 87
D. ADMINISTERING OFFICE IN INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
Under prior law the National· Office of the IRS was organized on
a general activity basis rather than a tax or subject basis. The field
offices of the Service were organized similarly. Within each of the
broad categories of activities there were service units with jurisdictional breakdown by subject matter. Thus, various aspects of National Office employee benefit plan and tax exempt organization
administration were contained in different branches of the National
Office. For example, the Miscellaneous and Special Provision Tax
Division under the Office of Assistant Commissioner (Technical)
contained an Actuarial Branch, a Pension Trust Branch and an
Exempt Organizations Branch; other aspects of employee benefit
plan and tax exempt organization administration were under the
Office of Assistant Commissioner, Accounts Collection and Taxpayer Service and the Office of Assistant Commissioner (Compliance).88
The tax committees of Congress acknowledged that concern had
been expressed in the context of administration of employee benefit
plans that the Service, with its primary concern the collection of
revenues, would not give sufficient consideration to the purposes for
which such organizations were exempt from income taxation. 89
Many believed the Service had subordinated concern for the
charitable or other interests of plan participants or the educational,
charitable or other purposes for which the exemptions were provided, to concern for the collection of revenue. The tax committees
recognized that the natural tendency of the Service was to empha87. H.R. REP No. 1280, supra note 43, at 360.
88. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 103; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 107
(1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 383].
89. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 103; S. REP. No. 383, supra note 88, at 107.
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size those areas that produce revenue rather than those areas primarily directed to maintaining the integrity of the purposes for
which the exemption provisions in question were created by Congress. At the same time the tax committees pointed out that the
enormous growth in retirement plans during the last third of a century had proceeded largely under the tax regulations of the IRS, and
clearly the greatest single protection for rank-and-file employees
during this period had been the Service's administration of the provisions denying any special tax treatment for contributions or benefits discriminating in favor of shareholders, officers and highly-paid
employees. The thrust of this anti-discrimination provision was to
require broader and more substantial participation in plans than
would have been provided without the Service's administration of
the statute. 90
Against this background Congress believed that in the employee
benefit plan and tax exempt organization areas it would be easier
to emphasize the basic objectives involved, if the activities relating
to these plans and exempt organizations were more closely coordinated; if the audit and ruling activities in these areas, whether in
the field or in the National Office, were brought together; and if the
direction for these activities emanated from a single office. 91
Accordingly, ERISA section 1051 amended Code section 7802 to
provide for an office within the IRS-the "Office of Employee Plans
and Exempt Organizations"-under the supervision and direction
of an Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 92
This office supervises and directs the basic activities of the IRS
in connection with pension plans and tax exempt organizations. In
connection with qualified plans Congress intended that the Office
of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations would be made responsible for, among other things, the determination of the qualification of the plan and the exemption from taxation of the related
trust. Questions as to the deductibility of contributions to a plan,
the taxability of a beneficiary of an employees' trust, and the
90. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 103-04; S. REP. No. 383, supra note 88, at 108.
91. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 104; S. REP. No. 383, supra note 88, at 108.
92. See !NT. REv. ConE oF 1954 § 7802, as amended. Currently the Assistant Commissioner
of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations is Alvin Lurie, a well-known pension and tax
practitioner.
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taxation of employee annuities are included as well within its jurisdiction. In addition, Congress planned that this Office would have
responsibility over the minimum standards relating to funding of a
plan and the excise tax for underfunding, as well as the enrollment
and reports of actuaries. 93 As to tax exempt organizations, the Office
of Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations is responsible for an
organization's exempt qualification, the taxes on unrelated business
income of an organization exempt from tax, and the rules relating
to the private foundation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 9 ~
These provisions regarding the new office took effect 90 days after
September 2, 1974. 95
ill. ERISA: ENFORCEMENT
A.

CIVIL ACTIONS BY PARTICIPANTS AND FIDUCIARIES

A civil action may be brought by a participant to recover benefits
due under a plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of a plan or
to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of a plan. 96 In
addition, a participant may bring an action for appropriate relief
from failure of a plan administrator to comply with a request to
furnish any information which he is required by Title I of ERISA to
disclose or furnish to a participant. 97 If the requested information is
not furnished as required under Title I, the court may impose a
personal penalty upon the plan administrator. 98 Under former law,
courts were reluctant to impose any penalty upon an administrator
for failure to furnish a participant with documents that were required to be disclosed. That trend was changing on the eve of
ERISA. 99
93. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 104.
94. /d. at 105.
95. ERISA § 1051(d), 26 U.S.C.A. § 7862 (1975).
96. ERISA§ 502(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra
note 43, at 327. ERISA provides these and the other "participant" remedies discussed in text
to a participant or a beneficiary; accqrdingly references in text to "participant" include
"beneficiary." Any money judgment so obtained against an employee benefit plan is enforceable only against the plan as an entity and not against any other person unless his liability
is established in his individual capacity. ERISA§ 502(d)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(d)(2) (1975).
97. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(l)(A) (1975). The required disclosure
must be made within 30 days after requested, but no penalty is imposed if the failure results
from matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator.
98. ld. 502(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (1975) (up to $100 per day).
99. Compare Harrold v. Coble, 261 F. Supp. 29, 38 (M.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 380
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In addition, a participant, as well as a fiduciary, may bring an
action for appropriate relief under ERISA section 409, which imposes liability upon a fiduciary for breach of his' fiduciary responsibilities under the Act. The relief may include removal of the trustee. uJn Participants and fiduciaries also may bring an action (1) to
enjoin any act or practice violating any·provisiori of Title I or of the
plan terms, or (2) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to
redress such violations, or (3) to enforce any provision of Title I or
the terms of the plan. 101 In addition, a participant or the Secretary
of Labor may bring an action for appropriate relief in the event of a
violation of the plan administrator's duty under the Code to give a
terminated employee a statement of any deferred vested benefit he
has at the time of termination. 102
The federal district courts have inclusive jurisdiction over actions
involving breaches of fiduciary responsibility and other actions to
enforce or clarify benefit rights provided .l;l~d~.r,';fitl~ 1.1°3 However,
suits to enforce benefit rights under the plap 1Cir· .to· recover benefits
under the plan which do not involve application of Title I provisions
may be brought not only in the federal district' courts but also in
state courts of competent jurisdiction 104 wh.icli thh~s enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction. The federal district courts have jurisdiction, whether
exclusive or concurrent, over both classes of actions without regard
to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. The
actions in federal or state courts are regarded as arising under the
laws of the United States in a similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA) . 10"' In any action brought by a participant or fiduciary, the
F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1967) and Doherty v. Sylvania Pension Plan, 310 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D.
Mass. 1970) tl'ith Redman v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975) and Wallace v.
Marine Eng. Benevolent Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 392 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. La. 1975).
100. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132( a)(2) (1975).
101. /d. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3) (1975).
102. !d. § 502(a)(4), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(4) (1975).
103. /d. § 502(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(f) (1975). This jurisdiction is without respect to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.
104. /d. § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e)(1) (1975). See Leonardis v. Local 282 Pension
Trust Fund, 391 F. Supp. 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
105. H.R. REP No. 1280, supra note 43, at 327. For discussion of some labor law principles
that may apply under ERISA due to this reference see Donaldson, The Use of Arbitration to
Auoid /,itigation under ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 215, 225 (1975).
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court may allow reasonable attorney's fees or costs to either party. 106
The United Mineworkers' pension fund litigation may foreshadow
how this provision will be applied. 107 A federal suit in the district
court may be brought in the district where the plan is administered
or where the breach of fiduciary duty took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found. 108 Process may be served in any other
district where a defendant resides or may be found. 109 If a participant or beneficiary brings an action in a federal court to enforce
his rights under Title I, he must provide a copy of the complaint
to the Secretary. of Labor and to the Secretary of the Treasury by
certified mail, but a copy is not required in any action which is
solely for the purpose of recovering benefits under the plan. 110 The
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Treasury, or both, have the
right to intervene at their discretion in any action. 111
Considerable discussion arose during the hearings concerning
causes of action by the individual participants, and in particular
class actions. On the one hand, some witnesses believed that class
actions would result in overly conservative plan administration,
while labor leaders at the same time were worried over frivolous
suits that would cost the trust fund legal fees. 112 Labor leaders advocated access to courts under a system that would deter such strikesuits. 113 The House bill would have required that actions by participants, except those to acquire benefits due under the terms of the
plan or to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the
106. ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132{g) (1975).
107. See Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1253-57 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Morrissey v.
Curran, 386 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
108. ERISA § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(e)(2) (1975).
109. Id. Subpoena or other legal process of a court upon a trustee or plan administrator
constitutes service on a plan. In addition, where a plan has not designated in the summary
plan description an individual as agent for service of process, service upon the Secretary of
Labor (who no later than 15 days thereafter will notify the administrator or trustee of such
service) constitutes such service. ld. § 502(d){1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(d)(1) (1975).
110. Id. § 502(h), 29 U.S.C.A. 1132(0 (1975).
111. Id. However, the Secretary ofthe Treasury may not intervene in any action under Part
4 (Fiduciary Responsibility) of Title I. Id. If the Secretary of Labor brings an action for civil
enforcement under Section 502(a) of the Act, he must notify the Secretary of the Treasury.
ld. As of February 2, 1976 the Labor Department had intervened in three cases brought under
ERISA. See Department of Labor News Release 76-71 (February 2, 1976), reprinted in 3 P-H
PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING~~ 135, 145 (1976).
112. See. e.g., Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 549.
113. H.R. 2 Hearings, .~upra note 2, at 7.
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plan, be brought only "upon leave of the court obtained upon certified application and for good cause shown, which application may
be ex parte." 114 This provision was not carried over into ERISA. 115
Thus, the danger of frivolous suits appears greater under the final
ERISA provisions than would have been the case under the House
bill.
The Department of Labor further suggested during the hearings
on pension reform that it would be desirable in class actions for
notice to be given to all concerned parties and that they be given
opportunity to be heard wherever reasonably possible. Moreover, to
avoid subjecting the fiduciary to a multiplicity of suits involving
similar facts and issues, representatives of Labor urged that any
pension reform bill also provide for a final judgment binding upon
other participants in the plan.ll6 Part of the problem in this context
may have arisen from the fact that under the House bill any action
brought by a participant or beneficiary other than to recover benefits due, or to obtain from the plan administrator information required to be disclosed, had to be brought as a class action if the law
of the jurisdiction provided for class actions and the court was satisfied that the requirements for a class action were not unduly burdensome as applied in the particular circumstances.ll7 This mandatory class action provision was also deleted in the final provisions
of ERISA.m This aspect may counterbalance to some degree the
danger of frivolous strike-suits. Moreover, the court may award
costs and attorney's fees to either party.
On the other hand, the individual non-class action remedy was
attacked in the hearings as being insufficient on the grounds that
(1) frequently the legal fees would exceed the recovery, uu (2) courtawarded attorney's fees might not be adequate, 120 and (3) difficulty prior to ERISA in finding lawyers to take retirement plan
114. H.R. 2, as passed by the House, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 503(i)(2) (1974) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 2].
115. Compare H.R. 2, § 503(i) with ERISA §§ 502(g) and 503(h), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(g),
1133(h) (1975).
116. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 207.
117. H.R. 2, .~upra note 114, at § 503(g)(l).
118. Compare id. with ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (1975).
119. Senate Finance Hearing.~•.~upra note 3, at 847.
120. H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 36.

1976]

ERISA

485

cases, which could drag on for years and years before recovery. 121
Furthermore, before ERISA, most misdeeds by plan administrators,
it was alleged, were brought to light in lawsuits by employees who
were not yet vested so that even if the plaintiff won, he might not
enjoy a present recovery and might never get a pension. 122 Therefore,
it was suggested that the equivalent of a legal aid office be provided
under any pension reform bill for participants with causes of actions
against plans. 123 These criticisms all seemed to point towards heavy
reliance upon the Department of Labor to enforce pension rights
under ERISA.

B.

CIVIL ACTIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

The Secretary of Labor may bring an action for breach of a fiduciary duty or to enjoin any action or practice that violates the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to obtain any other appropriate relief
to enforce any provisions of that title. 124 In addition, in the case of a
transaction by a party-in-interest as to a plan that is not qualified
under the Internal Revenue Code, the Secretary of Labor may assess
a civil penalty not to exceed 5% of the amount of the transaction,
with a second tier additional penalty of not more than 100% of the
transaction if it is not corrected within 90 days after the notice from
the Secretary of Labor. 125 This provision, of course, parallels the
excise taxes which the Internal Revenue Service may impose upon
violations of prohibited transactions by plans which are qualified
under the Internal Revenue Code.
Once the IRS has determined that a plan qualifies under the Code
(or if an application for determination is pending), the Secretary of
Labor may not bring an action for equitable relief as to a violation·
of the participation, vesting and funding "tandards of Title I by that
plan unless he is requested to do so by either the Secretary of the
Treasury, or in writing by one or more participants or fiduciaries of
that plan on their behalf. 126 Upon such request, the Secretary of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

ld. at 246.
Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 994.
H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 31-32.
ERISA§§ 502(a)(2), (4), (5) and (6), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(a)(2), (4), (5) and (6) (1975).
ld. § 502(i), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (i) (1975).
ld. § 502(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(b) (1975).
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Labor may exercise this authority only if he determines that the
violation affects, or enforcement is necessary to protect, benefit
claims of the plan participants. 127
Department of Labor attorneys represent the Secretary of Labor
in ERISA civil actions, except for litigation before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Claims, but all such litigation is subject to
the direction and control of the Attorney General. 128 Congress included this provision in ERISA in order to clarify that even though
litigation is conducted by Labor attorneys, the Attorney General has
the final authority to resolve any conflicts between the Labor and
the IRS on issues in litigation, and in such event, to assure that the
Government takes a uniform position before the courts. 129 In addition, the Attorney General has authority over the presentation of
issues of general importance to the courts, such as the constitutionality of federal laws. Thus, Congress intended the Secretary of
Labor generally to be represented in civil litigation by the Solicitor
of Labor and his attorneys, with appropriate arrangements being
made between the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General as
to the active involvement of the Justice Department in the types of
situations outlined above. 130
C.

PREEMPTION oF STATE LAw: DEVELOPMENT oF FEDERAL CoMMON
LAW

The provisions of Title I of ERISA supersede all state laws relating to any employee benefit plan established by an employer engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by a union that represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.l 31
However, as is the general pattern in Title I, preemption does not
apply to government plans, church plans not electing under the
vesting provisions, workmen's compensation plans, certain plans
maintained primarily for nonresident aliens and "excess benefit
plans." 132 Preemption also does not affect any cause of action, such
as for a breach of fiduciary responsibilities, that arose before Janu127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

!d.
!d. § 502(j), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(j) (1975).
H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 329-30.
/d. at 330.
ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (1975).
See ERISA§ 4(b) and first sentence of§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1003, 1144(a) (1975).
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ary 1, 1975, or any act or omission which occurred before that date. 133
In addition, the preemption provision does not apply to any state
criminal law of general application; nor does it exempt any person
from any state law that regulates insurance, banking or securities. 134
However, generally no employee benefit plan is to be considered as
an insurance company, bank, trust company or investment company, or engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any state law that regulates insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies or investment companies. 135
With the above few exceptions, the substantive and enforcement
provisions of ERISA are intended to preempt the field for federal
regulation, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent
state and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle
was intended by Congress to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of state or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof,
which have the force or effect of law.l36 Congress also intended that
a body of federal substantive law would be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private
welfare and pension plans. 137
It is likely that the federal district courts, or state courts applying federal law, in deciding benefit claims will develop the final
answers, perhaps independently of the Departments of Labor and
Treasury and of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, to preERISA issues that plagued state courts-application of the doctrines of quantum meruit and promissory estoppel to "partial terminations" and plant shutdowns. These cases will arise (1) where retirement plans are terminated in plant shutdowns (without full insurance by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) and (2)
where participants are terminated, instead of the plan, in a gradual
133. [d. § 514(b)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(1) (1975). This provision overrides earlier contrary implications of the floor debate on H.R. 2. See 120 CoNG. REc. H.1145 (daily ed. Feb.
26, 1974) (remarks of Representative Dent).
134. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1975).
135. ld. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1975).
136. ld. § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(c)(1) (1975); 120 CONG. REc. S 15742 (daily ed.
Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
137. 120 CoNG. REC. S 15742, S 15758 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1972) (remarks of Senators
Williams and Javits); 120 CoNG. REc. H 8701 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Dent).
138. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 11.411(d)-2(a)(1); 40 Fed. Reg. 51434 (1975).
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plant shutdown (and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
does not terminate the plan and the Service does not find a partial
termination of the plan, with immediate vesting of funded benefits
of the terminated participants). 138
In pre-ERISA case law and commentary the situation in which
employees were laid off in a gradual plant shutdown, but their retirement plan itself was not formally terminated, was frequently
analyzed. 139 Under IRS rules where a partial termination occurred,
the participants who were affected obtained immediate vesting of
their accrued benefits to the extent funded. Similarly where the
entire plan was terminated, the funded accrued benefits of all participants were vested. 140 Historically the Service had been reluctant
to find a partial termination, 141 although on the eve of ERISA a
contrary tendency could be seen. 142 Frequently employees with some
vested benefit who were terminated in gradual plant shutdowns that
did not result in a formal plan termination were left without relief.
The majority view in the state and federal courts (applying state
law) was that plan provisions, which universally provided for immediate vesting upon termination, referred to a formal termination of
the plan and not termination of the plant. 143 Employees who were
terminated, in whatever numbers and for whatever reasons, could
not claim that their termination itself effected such a discontinuance.144 For instance, in Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., w; one of
the leading "horribles" iri the area of plan "terminations", the state
appellate court held that where none of the conditions for termina!:19. See. e.g., Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems
and some Proposal.~. 76 HARV. L. REv. 952, 955 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bernstein);
Levin, Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Los.~ of Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. REv. 527, 557
(1970) !hereinafter cited as Levin).
!40. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(a)(2)(i), (ii) (1963). See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 41.41l(d)2(b)
and 2(a)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 29555 (1975).
!41. See Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 901-05.
142. See Rev. Rul. 72-510, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 223.
!4:1. See. e.g., Lovetri v. Vickers, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1975); Rothlein v.
Armour & Co., 377 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See generally Annat., 42 A.L.R.2d 461
(1955); Annat., 46 A.L.R.3d 464 (1972).
144. Lovetri v. Vickers, Inc. 397 F. Supp. 293, 298 (D. Conn. 1975).
145. Gorr v. Consol. Foods Corp:, 253 Minn. 375, 379, 91 N.W.2d 772, 775 (1958); accord,
Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958); Karcz v. Luther Mfg.
Co .. :1:18 Mass. :11:1, !55 N.E.2d 441 (1959). But .~ee Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. 111, 287
N.Y.S. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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tion expressly set forth in the plan had occurred, the plan continued
in force for the remaining employees and was not terminated. In less
than two years after acquisition of the employer by another corporation, the work-force had been reduced from 580 employees to 75,
only 42 of whom were plan participants. The decision resulted in a
windfall of $170,000 to the acquiring company because contributions were reduced. 146 A similarly rigid approach was taken in
Zeimaitis v. Burlington Mills, Inc. 147 A plant shutdown and an attendant attrition in work force caused so large. an amount of forfeitures from those employees who were terminated without a vested
interest in their accrued benefit that future employer contributions
were not necessary to keep the plan funded for the greatly reduced
number of plan participants. The court held that this did not result
in a complete discontinuance of contributions, which would have
required 100 percent vesting of the funded benefits. Employees in a
closed-down division did not fare any better in arguing that discontinuance of contributions as to their division constituted a termination of the plan as to them, i.e., a partial termination, 148 or that they
were entitled to be considered employees under the circumstances
despite their discharge. 149
Earlier pre-ERISA cases had long followed a gratuity theory
under which the employee had minimal rights, in no event extending beyond those provided in the employer-drafted retirement plan.
For instance, the appellate state court in George v. Haber 150 found
no termination, noting that the plan specifically stated that the
employer's contributions did not constitute wages, salary or compensation to any individual employee. Under such an approach the
plan would be a mere gratuity and the employer as donor would
have an unlimited right to fix the terms and conditions of the gift. 151
Similarly, some plans provided that the plan was not a contract of
146. Bernstein, supra note 139, at 955 n.12.
147. 56 Wis. 2d 449, 202 N.W.2d 244 (1972).
148. Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 13 Misc. 3d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct.
1958). Contra Femekes v. CMP Indus., Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 128, 222 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1961),
rev'd, 13 N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d 884, 246 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1963).
149. Machinists Local 240 v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959}. See Bernstein, supra note 139, at 957-58.
150. 343 Mich. 218, 72 N.W.2d 121 (1955).
151. See Neuffer v. Bakery Wkrs. Union, 193 F. Supp. 699 (D.D.C. 1961}, alf'd, 307 F.2d
671 (D.C. Cir. 1962}.
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employment or the participant remained subject to discharge at
will. 152 In addition, plans commonly stated that the employer retained the full power to terminate the plan, reduce contributions
and benefits and amend the plan in any fashion. 153 Most cases upheld such limitations so that the participants possessed no right to
force an employer to continue a retirement plan. 154 However, there
was a growing acceptance, even prior to ERISA, of the theory that
noncontributory retirement benefits actually constituted a substitute for direct compensation. 155 The majority view required awarding of an individual pension where the participant met all the plan
requirements for payment including years of service and vesting
under pay-as-you-go plans or where a funded plan itself was not
terminated, 156 notwithstanding any plan provisions permitting cancellation by the employer. 157
152. Hablas v. Armour Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959).
153. See, e.g., Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 533 n.15 (3d Cir. 1970);
Finnell v. Cramet, Inc., 289 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1961); Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958); Fickling v. Pollard, 51 Ga. App. 54, 179 S.E. 582 (1935); Lynch
v. Dawson Collieries, 485 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1972); Vocke v. Third Nat'! Bank & Trust Co.,
267 N.E.2d 606, 611 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1971). See generally Bernstein, supra note 139, at 957.
154. Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1970); Finnell v. Cramet,
Inc., 289 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1961); Neuffer v. Bakery Wkrs. Union, 193 F. Supp. 699 (D.D.C.
1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In re Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 49 F. Supp. 405 (D.
Mo. 1943); Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1 Ill. App. 2d 514, 117 N.E.2d 880
(1954); Molumby v. Shapleigh Hardware Co., 395 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Dolan v.
Heller Bros. Co., 30 N.J. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (1954-); Korb v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 258
App. Div. 799, 15 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1939).
155. See Bernstein, supra note 139, at 959-62; H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 508
(remarks of Representative Dent).
156. See Russell·v. Princeton Labs, Inc., 50 N.J. 30,231 A.2d 800 (1967); Cantorv. Bershire
Life Ins. Co., 179 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.E.2d 518 (1960).
157. Sheehy v. Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242, 227 N.E.2d 229 (1967); Vocke v. Third Nat'!
Bank & Trust Co., 267 N.E.2d 606, 612 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1971) (but still binding only after
specified period, such as vesting period). Moreover, a minority approach recommended by
commentators was to provide terminated employees, at least where the mass terminations
were employer-induced, rights as to vesting beyond those provided in the plan which usually
limited "termination" to formal plan terminations decreed by the employer's board of directors, or termination upon the occurrence of a stated event, such as sale of a division. See
Dierks v. Thompson, 295 F. Supp. 1271 (D.R.I. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 414 F.2d 454
(1st Cir. 1969) (concerning theories such as quasi-contract or unjest enrichment). Lucas v.
Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967). See Levin, supra note 139, at 560. But
see Lynch v. Dawson Collieries, 485 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1972); Zeimaitis v. Burlington Mills,
Inc., 56 Wis. 2d 449, 202 N.W.2d 244 (1972); Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 767 (1974).
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While the majority of cases had abandoned the gratuity concept
and held that a contractual obligation to meet the funding requirements under the plan as to accrued benefits arose once the participant had met all plan conditions, 158 these cases still found that a
participant who had not yet met the years of service requirement
for vesting under the plan was entitled to no pension, even where
"termination" rendered such performance impossible. 159 In
Thornberg v. MGS Co., 160 the plan contained a standard disclaimer
clause as to the employer's obligation to fund fully any past service
obligation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found no contractual or
quasi-contractual obligation to fund fully the plan once it wasterminated.
A federal district court, in Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 161 recognized
in 1967 that only two prior cases had found termination of a plan
due to a plant closing (one of them had been reversed and the other
effectively eroded by subsequent decisions), but no prior case had
ruled directly on the "assertion of a quasi-contractual right of pension benefits on the basis that such benefits are essentially a form
of compensation." 162 The Lucas opinion would on the proper facts
award a retirement benefit, not literally required by the plan, to
separated employees who had not met the years of service requirements for a vested pension based on two theories: (1) quasicontract-employees involuntarily separated from employment in
a group termination prior to vesting would be entitled to recover
a benefit equal to the benefit conferred on the employer (favorable tax treatment, retention of employees), 163 and (2) unjust158. Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 56 N.J. 169, 265 A.2d 657 (1970); Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 444 (1972). See also Delaware Trust Co., 222 A.2d 320 (Del. Ch. 1966).
159. Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827, 829 (2d Cir. 1958); Zeimaitis
v. Burlington Mills, Inc., 56 Wis. 2d 449, 202 N.W.2d 244 (1972); cf. Hudson v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 16, 22 (8th Cir. 1963); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d
942, 946 (7th Cir. 1956).
160. 46 Wis. 2d 592, 176 N.W.2d 355 (1970).
161. 277 F. Supp. 338, 345-46 (D. Minn. 1967).
162. /d. at 343.
163. Cf. Siegel v. First Penn. Banking & Trust Co., 201 F. Supp. 664, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1961);
Russell v. Princeton Labs, Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 231 A.2d 800 (1967). See generally Bernstein, supra
note 139, at 962-96. The Fifth Circuit in Connell v. U.S. Steel Corp., 516 F.2d 401, 408 (5th
Cir. 1975), noted that a difficulty with quantum meruit arguments is that "pension plans are
set up on the basis of actuarial estimates; it is expected that not every employee will ultimately receive a pension. The application of this theory to every employee may result in
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enrichment-an "actuarial surplus" that reduces the liability for
future contributions (or would be returned to the employer after the
benefits for the remaining employees were fully funded) constituted
unjust enrichment to the employer where a "group termination"was
not anticipated in the actuarial calculations. 164
Although the unjust enrichment theory finds support in a few
other decisions, 165 most subsequent decisions refused to find unjust
enrichment even in the face of such "actuarial surpluses" because,
for example, the employer did not retain the forfeited amounts and
only followed the plan provisions in reducing future liabilities. 166
Other holdings rejected the argument that deprivation of compensation (in the form of retirement benefits) after acceptance of the
employee's labor constitutes unjust enrichment, on the basis that
the pension was not earned "9ecause services were not rendered for
the requisite vesting period. 167 Still other decisions viewed Lucas v.
Seagrave solely as an unjust enrichment decision and then distinguished it when the facts involved employees who had separated
from service prior to a formal termination that did not result in an
actuarial surplus. 168 In any event, promissory estoppel arguments,
similar to those adopted in Lucas v. Seagrave, were elsewhere rejected by most courts because there was no detrimental reliance. 169
The few cases finding promissory estoppel usually did so only in the
context of eligibility requirements or individual pay-as-you-go retirement benefits rather than plan terminations. 170 A recent signifibankrupting a fund, thus depriving all employees of their pensions." Cf. Foley v. Devaney,
528 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1976).
164. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 345-46 (D. Minn. 1967). See generally
Bernstein, supra note 139, at 967-72; Levin, supra note 139, at 560.
165. Connell v. U.S. Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1975}; International Union U.A.A. & A. Wkrs. v. Textron, Inc., 359 F.2d 966, 969
(6th Cir. 1966).
166. Sbrogna v. Worchester Stamped Metal Co., 354 Mass. 17, 234 N.E.2d 749 (1968);
Levin, supra note 139, at 562.
167. Zeimaitis v. Burlington Mills, Inc., 56 Wis. 2d 449, 202 N.W.2d 244 (1972); cf. Boase
v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1970).
168. See Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 325 F. Supp. 666, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 465
F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972).
169. Boase v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 437 F.2d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 1970); Gallo v. Howard
Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Lynch v. Dawson Collieries, 485 S.W.2d 494
(Ct. App. Ky. 1972); Vocke v. Third Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 267 N.E.2d 606 (Mun. Ct. Ohio
1971); Thornberg v. MGS Co., 46 Wis. 2d 592, 176 N.W.2d 355 (1970).
170. Scheuer v. Central States Pension Fund, 358 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
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cant exception is International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Garwood Industries, Inc., 171 involving a plant
termination which "received nationwide notoriety as a particularly
heinous example." There the district court found that the employer had stated to employee representatives that the term "actuarially sound funding" meant that the trust fund would be maintained by the maximum deductible contributions. 172 In fact, only
the minimum contributions necessary to prevent a pre-ERISA tax
termination were made. 173 In reliance on these statements the representatives accepted the employer's economic package in collective
bargaining sessions. The employer was required to contribute to the
terminated plan the difference between the actual contributions
and the maximum deductible contributions, plus 6% interest.
In summary, the frequently recurring pre-ERISA state court issues (and federal court issues in exercise of diversity jurisdiction) of
partial termination, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment and quasiestoppel will reach their final answer (where the ERISA termination
insurance provisions do not fulfill completely the employer's promise)174 in the federal and state courts, applying for the first time
federal common law.
The other frequently recurring state court issue, now superseded
by ERISA, 175 was the effect of "bad boy" clauses which purported
to deny former employees their otherwise nonforfeitable retirement
benefits if they were discharged for cause or competed with their
former employer after termination of employment. While most state
Wicsstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co., 240 N.E.2d 401 (App. Ct. Ill. 1968).
171. 368 F. Supp. 357, 361 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom., International Ass'n of Mach's
& Aero Wkrs. v. Sargent Indus., 522 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1975).
172. Under the law at that time the maximum deductible contribution to a defined benefit
pension plan in most circumstances was an amount equal to the normal cost and an amount
not in excess of 10% of the past service liability. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(l)(C) (prior
to amendment by Pub. L. No. 93-406). Under this formula past service liabilities usually
would be amortized in 12-14 years. See H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 100 n.ll.
173. Under prior regulations a suspension of contributions to a defined benefit plan would
not constitute a discontinuance of contributions, triggering immediate vesting of funded
accrued benefits, so long a's the unfunded past service cost or liability (including unpaid
normal cost and interest thereon) did not exceed such unfunded cost as of the establishment
of the plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(a)(2) (1963). This rule no longer applies after ERISA to
plans subject to the minimum funding rules. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 411(d)(3)(B).
174. See ERISA§ 4022(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322 (1975).
175. See id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a).
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courts upheld such "bad boy" clauses, a minority struck them down
on public policy grounds. 176 The committee reports and the floor
statements accompanying ERISA unanimously repudiated such
"bad boy" clauses. 177 However, the temporary Treasury regulations
on minimum vesting standards acknowledge that to the extent that
a plan calls for more rapidly vested interest than required under the
applicable minimum vesting standard of ERISA, such excess vested
interest may be forfeited on account of a violation of a "bad boy"
clause contained in the plan without running afoul of the minimum
vesting standards of ERISA. 178 This conclusion is supported by a
literal reading of the statute. The regulations apparently constitute
the Service's reaction to an already existing analysis and practice
of some practitioners. It seems that the draftsmen of the temporary
regulations felt that what some knew, all should know.
These regulations do not address, however, the question whether
such "bad boy" provisions will be enforceable in state or federal
courts under the nascent ERISA federal common law. In light of the
clear bias of the legislative history, 179 one would expect the judges
who fashion the ERISA common law to strike down post-ERISA
"bad boy" clauses even where they pass IRS review due to the
imprimatur of the temporary regulations. The utilization of a "bad
boy" clause after ERISA can arise, if at all, only where the plan
grants more liberal vesting than is required under the statutory
minimums and then provides for a cutback of such vesting to one
of the statutory minimums (e.g., no vesting until ten years of service
have been completed), 180 if the participant should violate the plan's
"bad boy" clause by competitive behavior or discharge for cause.
The federal district courts or state courts applying federal law may
take the position that the plan's faster vesting schedule, having once
been granted, cannot be taken away because of a violation of a "bad
boy" clause on the grounds that the enforcement of such a clause
176. See Koehn & Ptack, Employer Protection Against Loss of the Key Employee, 57 IowA
L. REv. 75, 83-88 (1971); Note, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for Violations of Covenants
Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 290 (1966).
177. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 271; 120 CoNG. REc. H. 8701 (daily ed. Aug.
20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Dent).
178. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 11.411(a)-4'(c) Example (1), 40 Fed. Reg.
179. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 60; S. REP. No. 383, supra not.e 1, at 50; 120 CoNG.
REc. H. 8701 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Dent).
180. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 411(a)(2)(A).

1976]

ERISA

495

would be against federal public policy as articulated in ERISA's
legislative history.
In short, despite the exclusion of state common law, we may
expect to see a third strand of authority in precisely the pre-ERISA
areas of controversy which may conflict with the positions of both
Labor and the IRS: the ERISA federal common law.

D.

PREEMPTION OF OTHER FEDERAL LAWS

Presumably ERISA was not intended to preempt pre-existing federal statutory policing of private pension plans, even though it is
limited by statutory provisions such as section 302 of the TaftHartley Act (the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947). 181 That
provision, in questions other than kickbacks and extortion, 182 has
been limited to funda!llental, structural defects in the plan 183 (e.g.,
exclusion of a sizeable number of union members from the plan
without any reasonable purpose)1 84 or to arbitrary and capricious
application of plan terms. 185 It does not apply to questions involving
day-to-day fiduciary administration of pension funds. 185
The more difficult question is whether a pre-ERISA Service qualified plan provision precluding payment of a retirement benefit to an
employee could be violative of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. A district court in Daniel u. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Union 181 answered this question in the
affirmative, with no indication that its answer would change in a
post-ERISA plan.
Pre-ERISA union retirement plans frequently denied benefits
entirely if the years of service under the section 302 plan were inter181. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970).
182. The dominant legislative purpose of the section 302 Taft-Hartley Act restriction on
payments to employee representatives was to prevent employers from tampering with the
loyalties of union officials and to prevent the latter from extorting tribute from employers.
United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 304-06 (1956).
183. See, e.g., Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 164-65 (9th Cir. 1975); Blassie v. Kroger
Co., 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965).
184. See authorities cited in note 189 infra.
185. Beam v. International Org'n of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 511 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.1975);
Burroughs v. Board of Trustees, 398 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Cuff v. Gleason, 382 F.
Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated per curiam, 515 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1975).
186. See authorities cited in Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 165 (9th Cir. 1975).
187. CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L. REP.~ 95,453 (N.D. Til. March 1, 1976).
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rupted by a break in service of a certain duration. Apparently this
break in service rule was seldom understood by participants; in any
event a number of suits were brought under section 302 of the
LMRA alleging that such a rule prevented the plan from being
"for the exclusive benefit of employees." The results conflicted
greatly. The courts early evolved the principle that section 302 of
the Taft-Hartley Act only prohibited payments to trust funds that
failed to comply with the structural requirements of the Act. 188 As
long as the application of the plan rules by the joint board of a
section 302 plan (the named fiduciary under ERISA) was not arbitrary and capricious 189 and the plan eligibility or breaks in service
rules did not exclude a large number of employees without reason, 190
no violation of section 302 arose in this context, provided that the
plan clearly set forth the break-in-service provisions. Against this
backdrop the Daniel court cohsidered the claim of a Teamster who,
but for an absence of several months duration in 1960 resulting from
an involuntary lay-off, had worked for employers covered by his
local for 22lf2 years, yet was denied a pension under a noncontribution section 302 plan because twenty years of continuous
service was required for a pension. The court held that the plaintiff's
interest in the pension plan constituted a "security" 191 and he ac188. See Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 911 (1970).
189. Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1975); Burroughs v. Board of Trustees,
398 F. Supp. 168, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975)"(rules on vesting not arbitrary or capricious themselves, but application without notice was).
190. Compare Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1971) (rule providing for forfeiture where particip"ant completed minimum service for pension, then loss due to break before
normal retirement age is arbitrary); Roark v. Doyle, 439 F.2d 497, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (rule
requiring one year of covered service prior to retirement is arbitrary); Lugo v. Employees
Retirement Fund, 366 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (justiciable issue as to whether rule
requiring 90 months of employment in 10 years prior to retirement is arbitrary); Insley v.
Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (justiciable issue as to whether rule that
credited service lost after 3 year break is arbitrary) with Pete v. UMW, 517 F.2d 1275, 1283
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (1 year of service immediately prior to retirement requirement reasonable);
Brune v. Morse, 475 F.2d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 1973) (limitation of covered service to service
during period when industry covered by union reasonable; sounder funding for other
participants); accord, Phillips v. Unity Welfare Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
191. The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1935), defined
an investment contract, i.e., a security, as a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
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quired such interests by a "voluntary purchase" so that a "sale"
occurred. 192 Since "the various enactments of pension legislation
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
CCH ·1976 FED. SEc. L. REP. ,, 95,453, at 99,295-96.
The Daniel court agreed with the plaintiff that the pension fund that received the contributions was a common enterprise, and that the pension plan contributions were uniformally
recognized as part of employee wages. Secondly, the court held that the trustees of the
pension fund, which of course constitute a third party, had the sole power of control over the
common enterprise and investment of all of the assets which it contained. Finally, the court
held that profits were expected from the successful management of the funds in the form of
retirement benefits.
One would expect there could be no cavil with this conclusion as to a profit sharing or
defined contribution plan, in which the risk or success of the investments is said to fall upon
participants since their accounts share in the success and failure of the firm. However the
court found that the fact that the pension fund was that of a defined benefit plan did not
eliminate the element of profit. The court found this on two different levels. First, the total
expected payout for any member in excess of the contributions, i.e., the investment return
above the contributions which were in lieu of wages constituted a profit. Also on a sophisticated level the court pointed out that there was no warranty that the trust would be able to
fund the supposedly fixed benefit due to the participants and they thereby bore an element
of risk in the investment of their wages. Id. Thus, the court's analysis of the interest in the
retirement fund as a security appears correct in view of Howey.
192. The term "sale" is defined in the Securities Act of 1933 as "[e]very . . . disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). Substantially the
same definition is found in section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
The court in Daniel acknowledged that the SEC position had been that no registration was
required as to noncontributory and "compulsory" plans. CCH 1976 F'Eo. SEc. L. REP. ~
95,453 at 99,293. See Hearings on Proposed Amendments to Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 907, 908, 950 (1945) (remarks of Commissioner Purcell). See also
Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U.L.
REV. 195, 210 (1975); Miller, ESOPs/Stock Bonus Plans: Comments on Their Past, Present
and Future, 1 PENSION & PROFIT-SHARING J. 167, 179-80 (1975). In short, the SEC has historically declined to assume that an employee who participates in a retirement plan which is an
incident of his employment, in exchange for which he pays no additional consideration, and
to which he makes no contribution, "decides whether or not to work because of the nature in
the terms of the plan." Under this rationale the employee in such a situation is not an
investor. Historically the SEC has found that in the case of non-contributory plans the
employees did not receive their security interest for value, but rather as gifts. Alternatively,
in such circumstances the SEC took the position that the employees made no "investment
decision" and since the purpose of securities laws was to assure informed investment decisions
by prospective purchasers of securities, the Securities Act logically was inapplicable.
The Daniel court accepted the argument of the plaintiff that there was a disposition for
value. The court was on strong grounds in reasoning that the value element was satisfied by
the giving of services, since the majority view both in the cases, commentators and legislative
history of ERISA is that contributions to a qualified pension plan or to a profit sharing plan
are in lieu of current compensation. See, e.g., Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 722,
197 P.2d 807, 814 (1948); Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 909, 917 (1970); S. REP. No. 383, supra note 1, at 45. Thus, the district court
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. . . were designed to complement the securities laws rather than
displace them," if the plaintiff could show "material misrepresentations, omission to state material facts or use of manipulative or
fradulent devices, in connection with" such sale, i.e., that any information about the eligibility rule contained in the plan booklet,
letters and plan constituted a violation of the SEC antifraud provisions, he could obtain relief from the sale to the members of the
plaintiff's class of interests in the pension fund. Explicit in the
decision is the conclusion that ERISA (and prior pension legislation) does not preempt the SEC antifraud provisions in the context
-of a non-contributory Taft-Hartley pension plan (and possibly a
unilaterally established retirement plan as well).
The Daniel court's examination of the legislative history of various pieces of pension legislation, including ERISA, 193 lead it to the
in Daniel seems on strong ground in asserting that the "disposition" i.e., accrual of an interest
in a retirement plan by a participant, is a disposition of value. However, factually the Daniel
case involved a negotiated plan. And here the court's reasoning seems almost unassailable.
The employees must vote on the package negotiated by the union which makes a
division of increased increment of income between salary and pension benefits. The
Court is persuaded that few members would ever vote for an allocation to a pension
increase in lieu of a greater salary increase if they knew at the time of the vote that
they would have an eight percent or smaller chance of ever realizing any benefit from
the increased pension allocation. The final decision of such allocation to pension rather
than to salaries is with the employees and they thereby make the contribution from
the total wage package.
This decision to accept or reject the package is, furthermore, a voluntary one. The
fact that a majority vote may prevail does not negate the fact that this majority
provision is but an aggregate of many individual decisions. Moreover, the fact that
individuals of a contrary mind may be bound by the majority decision does not mean
that such individuals lack voluntary participation in the plan. CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L.
REP. ,I 95,453, at 99,297.
The district court in Daniel was very careful to state that it made no finding beyond the
narrow holding that the complaint alleged the sale of a security for purposes of application
of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts and violations of these provisions. "The
Court makes no finding with respect to applicability of any othar sections of these Acts to
employee pension plans such as the one here litigated." ld. at 99,298. In short, the court was
not speaking to the necessity for registration of the interest in the plans.
193. As was made particularly clear in the Congressional Reports accompanying enactment of the 1974 Act, that Act [ERISA] was concerned with ongoing administration
of pension funds, rather than with any sales in connection therewith. Thus, both
the Senate and House Reports expressed concern over the absence of effective federal
legislation directed at assuring equitable and fair administration of all pension plans.
Specifically, the lack of federal controls was seen with respect to protection of the
employee's security in his pension rights, rather than prevention of fraud in the sales
or acquisition of that interest. Consistent with this view, the 1974 Act imposed criminal
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conclusion that this legislation was designed to complement the
securities laws rather than displace them. Yet the court's vision of
ERISA is clearly astygmatic, as is revealed by the following passage:
It is significant to note that this entire body of pension legislation
(including ERISA) is concerned with administration of such funds,
so as to protect the interest of its participants, rather than regulation
of circumstances of entry into the plan. 19'

In fact, "[o]ne of the major objectives of the new legislation .
[was] to extend coverage under retirement plans more widely." 195
However, coverage is meaningless if a participant later forfeits his
rights to pension benefits upon voluntary or involuntary termination of employment. 196 This was a weakness of the section 302 plan
in Daniel, and ERISA would require full vesting prior to completion
of twenty years of participation (at most within 15 years of service
after attainment of age 22). 197 More significantly, ERISA contains
specific break in service rules under which pre-break and post-break
service (with a break in service for this purpose being defined as a
plan year in which a participant fails to complete more than five
hundred hours of service), are aggregated for vesting purposes if the
participant had attained any vested interest prior to his break or if
the duration of his break in service did not equal or exceed the
length of his pre-break service. 198 Thus, had the plaintiff in Daniel
incurred a similar post-ERISA break, it would have had no effect
upon his vested interest. 199
sanctions for any attempt to interfere with any employee's attainment of rights under
the Act. Similarly, as noted in these reports, the 1958 Act criminalized only malfeasance with respect to administration of such plans, including theft, embezzlement,
bribery and kickback. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEWS, 4639
(1974); S. REP. No. 127, 3 U.S. CODE CoNG. AND ADM. NEws, 4838 (1974).
CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 95,453, at 99,293-94.
194. ld.
195. H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 15.
196. ld. at 18.
197. ERISA§§ 203(a)(2), (b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1053(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (1975).
198. ld. §§ 203(b)(1)(D), (b)(3)(D), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1053(b)(1)(D), (b)(3)(D).
199. A pre-ElliSA break, as in Daniel, under a plan that so provided would, however, cutoff pre-break service under the rule that a plan may disregard years of service before which
Part I of Title I of ElliSA applies if such service would be regarded under the rules of the
plan as to breaks in service as in effect on the applicable date. Similar provisions exist in
INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 411. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 11.411(a)-5(b)(6) states that years of
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In short, ERISA does regulate the circumstances of entry, vesting
and break in service. Moreover, no set of ERISA rules works in a
vacuum. Participation and vesting are meaningless without adequate funding and in some circumstances plan termination insurance. 200 All of these provisions of ERISA are designed to mesh in
making the pension promise meaningful. On another level it is true
that the fiduciary rules are concerned with the administration of the
plan funds to protect the interests of participants. These interests
are determined under the participation and vesting rules and protected under the funding rules (and, indirectly, by the termination
insurance provisions). 201
Finally the Daniel court made another serious error in its reading
service completed before the first plan year to which section 411 applies are disregarded if
such service would be disregarded under the plan rules relating to breaks in service, whether
or not such rules were so designated in the plan, and such rules were in effect from time to
time under the plan. Generally, rules relating to required minimum hours or other length of
service are considered within the meaning of the term "break-in-service" rules.
In Giler v. Board of Trustees, 509 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975), a former union member challenged the "break-in-service" provision of a union plan. He had lost credit for seventeen years
of service when, after a voluntary termination, he failed to earn one quarter of coverage in
two consecutive calendar years. The Ninth Circuit held that the two year break rule was
reasonable as applied to him. The court noted that the ERISA "break-in-service" provisions
were restrictive. "If the 1974 Act had been in effect during the period of Giler's employment,
he would have been entitled to prevail. . . ." 509 F.2d at 849 n.l.
200. See ERISA §§ 301, 4001, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1081, 1301 (1975). See generally 120 CoNG.
REc. S. 15759 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Bentsen).
201. The only way that one can make termination insurance something other than
a dumping ground for the obligations of the employer is to put some sort of obligation
on the employer. At the present time the legal foundation of pension plans is that the
employer sets up a pension trust and promises to make periodic contributions into that
trust. If there are sufficient assets, the employee will get the pension that has been
described; if there are not, he does not get it; he gets something less. But the employer
up until the present time generally has not made the promise to pay the pension, only
to make periodic contributions.
With termination insurance we are now going to change the basic legal obligation of
the employer, because under the concept of employer liability we are saying to the
employer, in essence, as follows: "You no longer make a promise to only make periodic
contributions, based upon the actuary's computation of what your obligation is; under
this law if there is not sufficient money in that pension trust, for whatever reason
whatsoever, your assets will be liable toward payment of the pensions to make up the
difference between what is in the pension trust and the total of the pensions that have
been earned at the time of termination."
120 CoNG. REc. H. 1139-40 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1974) (remarks of Representative Erlenborn).
CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 95,453, at 99,296.
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of ERISA. It concluded that the SEC antifraud provisions were
necessary (as to participation in a retirement plan) because the
Securities Acts placed the burden of disclosure on the seller of a
security, i.e., plan or employer, while pension legislation, presumably including ERISA, did not.
Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, that there is a great need for
the application of the special fraud provisions, protections and remedies of the Securities Acts to plans such as the Local 705 Pension
Fund. This need is not met by either qualification under section 401
of the Internal Revenue Code or by filings under the 1958 Act or other
pension legislation. 202

Although the court's reading here of the pre-ERISA Internal Revenue Code provisions and of the Welfare Pension Plan Disclosure Act
of 1959 can hardly be faulted, 203 the court missed the mark as to
ERISA. Having given the participants substantive legal rights
(through the participation, vesting and fiduciary provisions) and
remedies (through a federal forum and in certain circumstances
representation by the Department of Labor), ERISA fashioned its
disclosure provisions to give participants the information necessary
to perfect those rights. 204 Under ERISA the plan administrator must
furnish each covered pension plan participant a summary plan description, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average participant. Among many other things the summary plan
description must set forth the circumstances that may result in a
participant's disqualification, ineligibility or forfeiture of benefits
(and in the latter context the break in service and years of service
202. The court continued:
Disclosure under the Code does not necessarily satisfy Securities Act disclosure standards which require that the facts must be disclosed in a form which is clearly understandable to the ordinary investor. The primary purpose of the Code is not protection
of the investor, but rather production of revenue and prevention of tax evasion.
Likewise, under the 1958 Act, the participant must take the initiative in seeking
information to which that Act says he is entitled. That is because the Act is designed
to regulate misuse of funds and disclosure rather than fraud. The Securities Acts,
however, place the burden of disclosure on the seller of a security. This is recognition
of the fact that fraud, by its very nature is practiced upon the unknowing. An employee
who is unaware of a fraud being perpetrated upon him is not benefited by a provision
which requires disclosure only upon his request. Id. (citations omitted).
203. See, e.g., H.R. 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 26-27, 339.
204. Id. at 27.
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rules). 205 In summary, after ERISA there appears to be no "great
need for the application of the special fraud provisions, protections
and remedies of the Securities Acts to [retirement] plans . . . . " 2116
The Daniel court erred in its conclusions that (1) the entire body
of pension legislation is concerned only with fund administration
and not with regulation of circumstances of entry into a plan (and
attainment of retirement benefits), and (2) the burden of disclosure
in clearly understandable terms has not been imposed upon plans
by any pension legislation. In fact, application of the Securities Act
fraud provisions to participation in non-contributory bilateral (and
possibly unilateral) 207 retirement plans would result in overlap of
jurisdiction as to disclosure and the remedies. ERISA and these
fraud provisions do not compliment each other; they would duplicate or conflict with each other. The question, therefore, must be
asked whether Congress intended or contemplated this result in
enacting ERISA. The defendants in Daniel argued that the body of
pension legislation culminating in ERISA was "indicative of Congress' belief that private pension plans were afforded no protection
by the federal securities laws, and that such legislation filled a large
gap in the law." 208 The court agreed that Congress had been convinced that the securities laws historically had not protected pension plans because of the SEC's position that non-contributory
plans did not involve "sales." Nevertheless, it still concluded that
none of the pension legislation had been designed to displace the
205. Proposed Lab. Reg. §§ 2520.102-2, .102-3(1), .102-3(1)(m), 40 Fed. Reg. 2465:1-54
(1975).
206. CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 95,453 at 99,296.
207. Factually the Daniel case dealt with a bilateral pension plan that had been an object
of collective bargaining, and part of the court's reasoning as to the voluntariness of the
plaintiffs acquisition of an interest in that plan derived from the fact of such collective
bargaining. "The final decision of such allocation to pension rather than to salaries is with
the employees and they thereby make the contribution from the total wage package." ld. at
99,297. This element ofvoluntariness appears directed to the earlier SEC position that in the
case of involuntary plans employees make no investment decision and hence the plans are
not within the purview of the purpose of the securities law. On the other hand, the court also
stated that under existing precedent performance of services by an employee could satisfy
the "value requirements" of a sale. See Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1289-90 (D. Mass.
1972). It is well established that contributions to a retirement plan whether unilateral or
bilateral are made in lieu of current compensation. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 383, supra note 1,
at 45; Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 909, 917
(1970).
208. CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 99,453 at 99,293.
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securities laws. Such an application of the fraud provisions of the
Securities Acts to disclosure by post-ERISA plans would add another tier of federal regulation and jurisdiction that Congress did
not consider in its elaborate interweaving of jurisdiction.
At the same time, it is clear that prior to ERISA there was a
serious gap in the protection of pension plans (not only in this area
of breaks in service, but also in others, such as plant shutdowns,
discharge for cause and inadequately funded plans). The temptation to plug this gap judicially with the SEC antifraud provisions,
where all pre-ERISA pension legislative schemes and legal theories
have failed, must be very strong. Perhaps one resolution would be
that ERISA does preempt the application of the SEC antifraud
provisions, but only as to causes of action arising after the effective
date of ERISA. Under this approach the plaintiff's antifraud violation action in Daniel apparently would not be preempted by ERISA.
However, Congress in fact does not appear to have considered explicitly in the enactment of ERISA the question of preemption of
SEC provisions in this context. 209 Indeed, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York had held in SEC v. Garfinkle 210 that
"the fact that ERISA gives the Secretary of Labor power to regulate
welfare funds in no way affects the SEC's authority over securities
transactions." The SEC allegedthat one of the defendants, who was
engaged in setting up limited partnership tax shelters, borrowed
money from a section 302 welfare fund without adequate security
and also sold "participations" in the limited partnerships to the
fund. Allegedly one of the members of the joint board of trustees
controlled a division of the fund and received kickbacks from the
promoter-defendant. Under ERISA if the transactions occurred
after January 1, 1975, 211 the promoter-defendant and trustee would
be classified as disqualified persons and would be subject to imposition of excise taxes by the Service for this violation of the prohibited
209. The legislative history does suggest, howe.ver, that Congress believed that only Labor
affected the administration of private pension plans. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1973); Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 3, at 1055·74 (Memorandum by Senators
Williams and Javits). Thus, there is strong support for the position that preemption of the
Securities Acts in the context was not expressly provided for because it was not believed that
they would apply to regulation of pension plans.
210. CCH 1976 FED. SEc. L. REP. 'il95,020 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) [Transfer Binder].
211. ERISA§§ 414(a) (general effective date of fiduciary provisions of Title I) and 2003(c)
(effective date of prohibited transaction provisions of Title II), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1114(a) (1975).
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transaction rules. 212 The trustee would be a fiduciary and subject
also to Title I liability enforced by the Department of Labor for his
alleged breaches of fiduciary responsibility and engaging in prohibited transactions. 213 The SEC in Garfinkle moved (1) to preliminarily enjoin the defendants (including the promoter and the trustee)
from further securities acts violations, (2) to appoint a receiver of
the welfare fund for an accounting of certain moneys from the
promoter-defendant and for payment by the promoter and trustee
into court of the money illegally obtained. The court, reasoning that
the receiver and disgorgement relief should go to trial and not be
resolved by preliminary injunctions, granted the former injunctive
relief sought only.
The trustee argued that the SEC lacked standing to sue because
ERISA had vested jurisdiction over welfare funds in the Department of Labor. The court's response squarely addresses the issue of
preemption:
While there is legislative intent to avoid duplication of efforts in
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1134, regulation of the securities transactions
which are part of the investment program of a fund is not equivalent
to regulation of the fund itself. The SEC clearly has concurrent, if not
exclusive, standing to sue. 214

An alternative resolution may be the adoption of the view that
post-ERISA disclosure is adequate for the SEC antifraud provisions. This should be the case as to most denial of benefit claims,
because ERISA requires disclosure of eligibility, vesting and service
requirements (with particular emphasis on disclosing the circumstances causing a forfeiture of benefits). This might not be the case
with terminations of underfunded plans or involuntary terminations
in plant shutdowns. The ERISA disclosure provisions, as interpreted by proposed Labor regulations, do require certain references
to termination insurance. 215 However, they do not appear to require,
for example, explicit disclaimers in the summary plan description
that, if the plan is terminated prior to full funding, the participants
212. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 4975(e)(2)(B), (2)(A), 4975(c)(1)(B), (l)(E) and (l)(F).
213. ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(B), 406(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104(a)(1)(B), 1106(b)(3) (1975).
214. CCH 1976 FEn. SEc. L. REP.~ 95,020, at 95,579 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) [Transfer Binder].
215. Proposed Lab. Reg. § 2520.102·3(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 24654 and Preamble to 2520.102-2,
40 Fed. Reg. 24644 (June 9, 1975).
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will only receive an allocation of funds based on a priority system
beginning with pensions in pay status first, and then going down a
tier system. 216 Yet under the Daniel analysis it is doubful that few
younger participants would vote for a pension increase in lieu of a
salary increase if they knew that they would receive little or nothing
if the plan were terminated in the immediate future. In such circumstances if the fact of the employer's undisclosed inability to
continue (or begin) adequate funding under ERISA were added, it
is likely that an otherwise adequate ERISA disclosure would not be
adequate for the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts.
Moreover, remedies for such violation of the Securities Acts might
vary substantially from or conflict with the ERISA provisions relating to termination of an underfunded plan. 217
In summary, although the question of whether the SEC antifraud
provisions are preempted in the post-ERISA era is very difficult to
answer, it is exceedingly important. A federal common law approach probably would strike a balance between increased plan
costs and benefits to participants in area of disclosure (and indirectly the underlying substantive areas of participation, vesting and
plan terminations) quite differently than Congress did. The courts
responding to pleas to fashion disclosure obligations under the
Securities Acts similar to those of ERISA should pay heed to the
recent analysis of the Second Circuit in Lugo v. Employees Retirement Fund of the Illumination Products Industry: 218
216. See ERISA § 4044(a) (allocation of assets upon termination of a defined benefit plan
covered by ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a) (1975).
217. Under ERISA§ 4062 an employer may be liable for up to thirty percent of its net worth
upon termination of a defined benefit pension plan and guaranty by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation of the unfunded accrued liabilities for the excess of the current value
of the plan's guaranty benefit over the current value of its assets allocable to such benefits
on the date of termination. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (1975). In short, the liabilities of the employer
are not for the entire unfunded vested accrued liability for benefit earned by the participants,
but only for the insured vested accrued benefit over assets, and even then with a ceiling of
thirty percent of net worth. It is likely that the remedy for the violation of the securities act
would be the entire vested accrued benefit (less plan assets at that time).
218. 529 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1976). (citation omitted). Clearly Congress in each of these
areas balanced the benefits to participants of what would be the ideal rules, such as immediate participation, immediate vesting and full portability and guaranty of pension benefit
with increased costs to the employer of each aspect, and reached compromises in each area,
including funding, weighing increased costs with benefits achieving their own trade offs. See.
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 15, at 19, 25, and 87. That courts will be entering into
this balancing process if they begin to examine violations of the antifraud provisions of the
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The length and detail of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq., indicate that the regulation
of pension funds with regard to such matters as vesting and procedural rights is a complex task more appropriate for Congress than for
the courts. The careful attention paid by Congress in that recently
enacted statute to the problem of effective dates and coverage makes
us hesitate to conclude that the courts have long been authorized, via
. . . [the exclusive benefit of employees requirement of the TaftHartley Act], to create obligations similar to those of ERISA.

It seems that any increase at this time in uncertainty as to what is
required in disclosure if plan details will outweigh any advantages
to particular participants or classes of participants. Daniel appears
to be a case of just enough, but far too late. Ten years ago it would
have made ERISA unnecessary; now ERISA makes it pernicious.
E.

INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY

The Secretary of Labor has the power to investigate whether there
have been or are going to be violations of any provisions of Title I,
including but not limited to violations of the disclosure requirements and of the fiduciary standards. 219 In such investigations he
may require the submission of reports, books and records and the
filing of supporting data by the plan administrator. He may not,
however, require any plan to submit such books and records or
supporting data to him more than once a year, without reasonable
cause to believe that there has been a violation ofTitle I ofERISA. 220
The Secretary of Labor may make "spot" or on premise investigations by entering places, inspecting records and accounts, and questioning those he deems necessary to enable him to determine the
facts relative to investigation only if he has reasonable cause to
believe that there has been a violation under Title I, or if the entry
is pursuant to an agreement with the plan. 221 Senator Javits stated
securities acts with attendant benefit claims being paid to participants may be appreciated
by examination of Brune v. Morse, 475 F.2d 858, 860-61 (8th Cir. 1973), in which the Court
of Appeals reviewed the question of the arbitrariness of a Taft-Hartley joint board's interpretation of its eligibility requirements (the same type issue as involved in Daniel) and rested
their conclusion as to the correctness of the action of the joint board by looking at the effect
of such decision on the funding requirements of the plan.
219. ERISA § 504(a)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1134(a)(l) (1975).
220. ld. §§ 504(a)(2), (b), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1134(a)(2), (b) (1975).
221. ld. § 504(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1134(a)(2) (1975).
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in the floor debate that a plan administrator's refusal to permit such
"spot" investigation (thereby resulting in the greater expense in
producing its books and records in Washington, D.C.) would constitute a breach of fiduciary responsibility. 222
The Secretary of Labor was also given the same subpoena powers
as are given to the Federal Trade Commission. 223 Moreover, the
Secretary of Labor may delegate his auditing and investigative
functions over insured banks acting as fiduciaries of employee benefit plans to appropriate federal banking agencies. 224
·F. INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS
ERISA makes it unlawful to interfere with a participant's attainment of any rights to which he may become entitled, 225 or to
coercively interfere through the use of fraud, force or violence to any
participant for the purpose of preventing him from exercising any ·
right to which he is or may become entitled under the plan or Title
I of ERISA. 226 As did Senator Williams in the debate on ERISA
itself, 227 Senator Javits in the floor debate on the Senate bill, 228
which contained essentially identical provisions, 229 stated that such
interference with rights included firing a participant to prevent
vesting. A participant may bring a civil action against any person
who interferes with his rights protected under ERISA and in addition against any person who willfully uses fraud, force, violence or
threats to restrain, coerce or intimidate any participant for purposes
of interfering with the latter's rights under the plan or Title I of
ERISA. The defendant will be fined $10,000 or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both. 230
222. 120 CoNG. REc. S. 15750 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
223. ERISA § 504(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1134(c) (1975) ..
224. See 120 CoNG. REc. S. 15751 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
225. ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1140 (1975). This provision is enforceable through
ERISA § 502 and additionally anyone willfully violating any provision of Part I of Title I
of ERISA is subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 ($100,000 in the case of a person other
than an individual) or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id. § 501, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1131 (1975).
226. ld. § 511, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1141 (1975).
227. 120 CoNG. REc. S. 15742 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
228. 119 CoNG. REc. S. 16742-43 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1973) (remarks of Senator Javits).
229. H.R. 4200 as passed by the Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699A (1973).
230. H.R. REP. No. 1280, supra note 43, at 331.
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EFFECTIVE DATES

The initial and operational stage jurisdiction provision applied
effective September 2, 1974, the date of enactment of ERISA. 231 The
provisions regarding the new Office of Employee Plans and Exempt
Organizations became effective ninety days thereafter. 232 Causes of
action and acts or omissions arising after December 31,1974, are
subject to the ERISA Labor Enforcement rules. 233 Generally causes
of action arising prior to January 1, 1974 (even if discovered thereafter) will continue to be subject to state jurisdiction, such as it is. 23 ~
V.

CONCLUSION

A final evaluation of the interweaving by Congress of jurisdiction
between the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury under ERISA is premature. At this stage we have only the
structure devised by Congress, the commencement of qualification
by the IRS of plans in the intial stage jurisdiction and some joint
rulings and procedures, particularly in the fiduciary area. At this
point of development it seems that the structure is workable and
that there has been satisfactory, even commendable cooperation
and coordination between the IRS and Labor. But the acid test will
come when joint exemptions from prohibited transactions are developed and the operational jurisdiction of the IRS becomes active. In
all likelihood, cooperation in plan qualification will proceed
smoothly. In audits of plans a conflict will probably arise only if the
natural tendency of auditing agents to disqualify plans is sustained
in higher reviews in the face of an inclination by the Department of
Labor to seek compliance with ERISA instead. In exemptions from
prohibited transactions the difficulty is less likely to be conflicts
between the agencies and more a question of bureaucratic delay
because transactions currently must pass review in both depart231. This assumes that the plan itself is subject at that time to ERISA. Technically,
ERISA § 3001 is inapplicable to an application to a plan received by the Secretary of the
Treasury for the date on which Code § 410 applies or would apply if it were qualified. ERISA
§ 300l(e), the temporary regulations probably properly so, obviate this problem.
232. ERISA § 1051(d), 26 U.S.C.A. § 7802 (1975).
233. ld. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (1975).
234. !d. § 514(b)(l), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(l).
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ments. In short, to date the interweaving of jurisdiction has worked
and in all probability will work as ERISA develops further.
If, however, retirement plans are subject to a third jurisdiction,
that of the SEC, or more likely to judicial review based not upon
ERISA and the Code but upon the common law development under
SEC antifraud provisions, the elaborate interweaving of jurisdiction
is likely to become quite tangled.

